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Turkey is facing a critical political turning point. The rupture of the Gezi protests 
of May–June 2013 was fol lowed by a spate of corruption allegations against the AKP 
(Justice and Development Party) in December 2013 and the unleashing of a power 
struggle between the AKP and the Fethullah Gülen move ment. The successes of the 
AKP in the local elections of March 2014 and in the vote of August 2014, which saw its 
leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, rise to the presidency with a large percentage of the 
vote, were followed by the loss of a parliamentary majority in the national elections 
of June 2015. The failure of the political parties to form a gov ernment after the vote 
meant that the country went through  new elections in November 2015. The AKP won 
the elections with increased majority. These developments are taking place within an 
increasingly troubled domestic context, with the peace process between the govern-
ment and the Kurdish minority collapsing and the ugly spectre of violence and war 
once again haunting the country. Violence and war are also affecting Turkey from the 
south, with the Arab uprisings of 2011 having unleashed turmoil in the Middle East 
region as a whole and particularly in neighbouring Syria.
The current juncture of Turkish history, following 13 years of uninterrupted AKP 
parliamen tary dominance, offers an interesting vantage point from which to ponder 
the question of Turkish democracy. The balance sheet, as always, is a mixed one. The 
political success of the AKP has been impressive: it is rarely that a party has increased 
its majority while in government, as the AKP did in the second and third contests it 
faced, in 2007 and 2011, following the initial victory of 2002. The length and endur-
ance of the AKP’s electoral success have eliminated the need for coalition governments. 
This has offered the country a period of extended political stability which has not 
only allowed the economy to thrive but may also have contributed to the maturation 
and smoother functioning of state institutions and political processes. More intangi-
bly, popular engagement and a sense of participation may possibly turn out to have 
increased the sense of ownership of the political process in wide segments of the Turk-
ish public.
The greater positive contribution to Turkish democracy of the 13 years of AKP gov-
ernment, however, must be that it has broken the Kemalist establishment’s hold on 
power. Whatever our assessment of the values, practices and ideas of any given polit-
ical formation or party, we must agree that democracy requires political pluralism. If 
democracy is seen as the most important value and goal for a polity, then alternation in 
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government is necessary. The AKP has represented a counter-narrative to the Kemal-
ist establishment in Turkey, being, as it is, a party with Islamist roots (though it rejects 
the label of an Islamist party itself). It has also embodied the advent of a political, 
social and economic counter-elite. The defanging of the Turkish military and its being 
dragged down from its pedestal as the guardian of the Turkish state have been the 
main outcome of this alternation. Whatever the true motives behind this development, 
it can only be a positive one, given that in a democracy there must be civilian oversight 
of the army. The same can be said about the opposition to the AKP: it is admittedly in 
a position of weakness currently but when that is overcome, and it reaches the point 
of being able to challenge the AKP, it will have done so on the back of its own efforts 
to convince and mobilise the Turkish public – not with the support of the Kemalist 
establishment or a sense of entitlement.
The other side of the balance sheet, however, is long and growing at an alarming rate. 
If the arrival of a counter-narrative and a counter-elite is a healthy sign, their continu-
ing dominance is beginning to be problematic in itself: to put it simply, the AKP has 
been too powerful for too long for the good of Turkish democracy. There are two issues 
here: majoritarianism and Islamisation. With each year of its being in government, the 
AKP has used the support of the majority of the electorate to disregard the views of 
and indeed trample on the minority. The rule of law, freedom of the press and the 
separation of powers have increasingly suffered, as seen in the Ergenekon trials and 
the witch-hunt against the Fethullah Gülen movement. Turkey is notorious for impris-
oning and persecuting its journalists. The government, particularly in the person of 
prime minister and later president Erdoğan, is emitting a more and more intolerant 
and authoritarian discourse. An additional worrying sign is a creeping Islamisation 
not only of the public sphere but also of social life, education and culture. The areas 
of women, gender and sexuality are of particular concern here. Even in the complex 
sphere of foreign policy, one can observe a sectarian (Sunni) element in operation. With 
regard to the most important problem facing Turkish democracy, namely the Kurdish 
issue, hopes that there would be progress in resolving it were dashed in 2014–15. In 
addition, Turkey remains divided along ideological, as well as ethnic, lines, with the split 
between Kemalists and Islamists – and the suspicion, unease and disquiet it brings with 
it – remaining unbridgeable. This is an obstacle to the smooth running of a democratic 
polity which requires a considerable degree of consensus and cooperation.
The major questions which surround the future of democracy in Turkey are about 
insti tutions and attitudes. The progress achieved over the past few decades, and, 
indeed, over the past few years, in that direction must not be underestimated. How-
ever, the flaws and problems remain profound, and there has been regression in many 
areas. It is clear that institutions are still not sufficiently robust and the toleration of 
difference not sufficiently developed for Turkey to be said to have achieved the status 
of a mature democracy.
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It is to address as many aspects of the above issues as possible that the Middle East 
Centre and the Chair in Contemporary Turkish Studies at LSE organised a panel dis-
cussion and a workshop on the state of democracy in Turkey on 19–20 March 2015. 
The panel addressed the questions of women, popular attitudes towards democracy and 
state–civil society relations. The workshop focused on state institutions and the rule of 
law (the constitution; the judiciary, the legislature and the separation of powers; secu-
rity sector reform); civil society and political culture (the political opposition; minority 
issues; LGBT rights and gender); and the question of democracy in the context of for-
eign relations (the influence of international norms and institutions on legal reform, 
the impact of the EU accession process and the question of the Middle East). We were 
honoured by the attendance of an impressive range of academic participants, although 
unfortunately Professor Talip Küçükcan of Marmara University was unable to attend.
A selection of the papers presented at the panel and workshop is published here, 
under the auspices of the Middle East Centre. They do not represent all our discus-
sions but focus on some of their key aspects. Deniz Kandiyoti’s paper on the gender 
wars in Turkey argues that the politicisation of gender issues is ‘triggered by the fact 
that stirring up moral anxieties over women’s conduct and propriety had become one 
of the key pillars of the AKP’s populist discourse: a discourse that pits a virtuous “us” 
– the real people – against an immoral “them”’. The paper tracks the gains in terms
of women’s rights in the early years of the AKP and their unravelling in the later
AKP period. Examining the impact of legal reform and the role of civil society on
human rights, Emma Sinclair-Webb ‘reflects on how Turkey’s presentation of legis-
lative changes as progress under the scrutiny of the EU, UN and Council of Europe
helped skew the facts and divert attention from the lack of institutional underpinning
for reform, the lack of political accountability, judicial independence and oversight
mechanisms, and other structural factors with implications for a culture of rights’. She
argues, in a nutshell, that ‘a legalistic approach has substituted for a real commitment
to reform’. Meltem Müftüler-Baç argues that ‘in 2015, it is possible to witness a differ-
ent outcome: a stalled negotiation process with dim prospects for Turkey’s accession to
the EU, and a backsliding into authoritarianism in the country’. She tracks the impact
of political conditionality by the EU on domestic democratic reform in Turkey and its
unintended consequences. which include majoritarian authoritarianism. Since 2011
in particular democratic consolidation ‘has taken a nosedive’. Yaprak Gürsoy, writing
on security sector reform in Turkey, argues that despite some gains in civil–military
relations (though civilian control over the military is not complete), reform in the
police and intelligence sectors has not resulted in democratisation, mainly because
the motives behind the reform have been politically charged, with the aim of ‘creating
loyal security services’.
